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Abstract
Our autobiographical self depends on the differential recollection of our personal past, notably
including memories of morally laden events. While both emotion and temporal recency are well
known to influence memory, very little is known about how we remember moral events, and in
particular about the distribution in time of memories for events that were blameworthy or
praiseworthy. To investigate this issue in detail, we collected a novel database of 758 confidential,
autobiographical narratives for personal moral events from 100 well-characterized healthy adults.
Negatively valenced moral memories were significantly more remote than positively valenced
memories, both as measured by the valence of the cue word that evoked the memory as well as by
the content of the memory itself. The effect was independent of chronological age, ethnicity,
gender, or personality, arguing for a general emotional bias in how we construct our moral
autobiography.
INTRODUCTION
An essential dimension of how we think of people is normative: some are good, others bad,
some should be praised, others punished. Moral judgment pervades not only how we think
of others, but also how we view ourselves, and it appears plausible that a large proportion of
the memories that matter the most to us personally are morally laden. Curiously, despite
great interest both in moral cognition (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2007; Moll, Zahn, de
Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005) and in autobiographical memory (Berntsen &
Rubin, 2002; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997; Schacter, 1996), memories for moral events have
received scant investigation. Part of the reason for this neglect is no doubt the effort required
to collect such memories in the first place; another may be the presumption that moral
memories are no different from other emotional memories.
A large literature has demonstrated that our recollections of past events can be, and indeed
easily are, distorted (Schacter & Slotnick, 2004; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). Emotional
memories are typically more vivid, recollected more readily and with a stronger sense of
familiarity, even though they are not necessarily more accurate in their details (Christianson
& Loftus, 1991; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; Winograd & Neisser, 1992). Studies of so-called
“flashbulb memories” have probed the possible effects of emotion on memory in events
such as the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center (Talarico & Rubin, 2003) or the
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explosion of the Challenger space shuttle (Neisser & Harsch, 1992). The findings have been
mixed. One the one hand, there is evidence that highly emotional events in real life are
remembered analogously to those in laboratory experiments, demonstrating that emotional
arousal enhances memory encoding and consolidation (McGaugh, 2004; Phelps, 2006). On
the other hand, it has become clear that at least some flashbulb memories are not at all
accurate and that strongly emotional events might lead more to increased conviction and
vividness on the part of the participants than accurate correspondence to the facts (Talarico
& Rubin, 2003). It may be that flashbulb memories occur under such highly emotionally
arousing circumstances that they are not analogous to milder emotional memories in this
regard.
The debates regarding flashbulb memories notwithstanding, one might expect that moral
memory would involve mechanisms and effects similar to those that come into play for
emotional memory in general. In particular, given that moral events are typically judged to
be emotional and that their perception involves some of the same brain structures that are
also involved in the emotional modulation of memory (Moll et al., 2005), one would expect
moral memories to predominate in our autobiography and to be recollected with especially
vivid detail and accompanying reliving of some of the emotion. On the other hand, just as
emotionally highly salient memories can be distorted (Loftus, 1993; Schacter & Slotnick,
2004), so could moral memories.
A few studies bear out these initial predictions. For example, the extent to which moral
blame is assigned to an act influences its memorability (Pizzaro, Laney, Morris & Loftus,
2006) and a person’s stage of moral development influences how women recollect their
decisions surrounding the termination of an unwanted pregnancy (Blackburne-Stover et al.,
1982). Taken together, the studies suggest an important mechanism whereby our
autobiographical self develops throughout the lifespan. Rather than being a simple accrual of
laid down memory traces, our autobiography is better viewed as an active construction
(Barsalou, 1988; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) perhaps mechanistically not too
different from simulations of our anticipated future (Schacter & Addis, 2007) and one that is
significantly shaped by those episodes in our lives that concern us the most emotionally and
morally.
Here we investigated one broad aspect of memory reconstruction: how the valence of moral
autobiographical events influences our memory for them. We collected a unique database of
over 700 autobiographical moral memories and characterized this material in terms of
temporal remoteness and emotional valence. In addition, we probed possible contributing
factors through an extensive assessment of all participants. The results argue for a strong
effect of temporal remoteness on the valence of recollected moral memories, independently
of any other factors: we remember our best deeds as the most recent ones, and our worst
deeds as the most remote ones.
METHOD
Complete details of this study are described in Escobedo (2008); the full set of ratings on
questionnaires is given also the Supplemental Online Materials accompanying this article.
Participants
We recruited 100 healthy adults from the Los Angeles community through an online job
posting website (craigslist.com), a selected participants between the ages of 40–60 (mean =
48.9 ± 5.9 years), with equal gender distribution and with a racial composition matching that
of the state of California (Table 1). All participants were screened for coherence and fluency
in their English language skills, although they were not required to be native English
Escobedo and Adolphs Page 2
Emotion. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2011 August 1.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
speakers. All were required to have been residents of Southern California for the past 15
years or more and we excluded any with a history of neurological or psychiatric disease.
Participants gave informed consent and received written assurance of anonymity regarding
their data. Demographic information was collected about each participant through a series of
pencil-and-paper questionnaires. The population demographics of our final group matched
the California census averages on IQ (mean = 110), gender distribution, and ethnicity. Our
sample also included the expected proportion of right- and left-handed people and varied in
occupation, sexual orientation, political, religious and cultural backgrounds. Overall, our
sample provided a highly representative sampling of the general, healthy, English-speaking
population in Southern California within the ages of 40–60 years old.
Procedure
Participants were tested on 2 separate days, spaced several weeks apart (mean = 71.7 ± 37.8
days, range = 181 days). In the first visit, we collected background data and memories; in
the second visit, participants rated the moral memories they had produced during the first.
During the first testing session, a battery of questionnaires was administered to collect
background information and generate neuropsychological profiles of the participants. (A
subsample of these findings can be seen in Table 1.) After these assessments, a cued
memory recall task was administered to collect moral memories.
To elicit autobiographical memories of morally laden events, we designed a cue-elicitation
protocol similar to that used in previous memory research (Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974;
Rubin & Schulkind, 1997). Participants were seated in a room by themselves in front of a
computer that recorded their spoken memories for later transcription. The setting was
comfortable and private and participants were assured that their recollections would be
confidential. The computer-administered task began by asking participants to recall a
memorable life experience. Participants were instructed to try to make each memory
approximately 3 minutes in length and a countdown timer was provided for their reference.
After completing their first recollection, participants were asked to recall an additional 4
memorable life experiences. These recollections served to familiarize the participants with
the equipment and the timing and provided them the opportunity to request help from the
researchers before beginning the experimental portion of the task. We chose 30 cue words to
prompt moral recollection, spanning both positive and negative affect, and comprised of
three broad categories: words denoting emotions, actions, or superlatives (see Table 2). Each
cue word appeared on the screen in a specific question (e.g., “Please talk about a time when
you did something that made you feel GUILTY”) and participants were instructed to recount
a specific, personal, autobiographical event related to that question. It is important to note
that at no point were participants informed that this task was specifically about moral
memories. Many participants became emotional during the narration of their memories and
were encouraged to take breaks as needed. Participants spent approximately four hours
(including breaks) completing the task. Participants filled out an exit questionnaire about
their experience at the end of the session to assess the emotions they experienced during the
task.
To estimate the incidence of confabulated memories, we contacted 44 of the original 100
participants over the phone, two years after data collection. These participants were told that
we were doing a follow-up to the original experiment about honesty and were explicitly
asked if they had produced completely truthful narratives, to the best of their knowledge. In
addition to collecting these self-reports of honesty, participants were asked if they would be
willing to speak to an assistant anonymously about the memories they had produced. 11
participants participated in this second testing session. The research assistant prompted the
participant to re-tell a memory by providing a short sentence about the original memory (e.g.
“You told a story about returning a lost wallet. Can you tell me about that?”). Each
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participant was asked to recall three memories and the assistant rated each recollection’s
similarity to the original memory.
Cue Word Selection
Eighty-eight words pertaining to morality were generated as potential cue words during a
brainstorming session among several researchers. Initial examination revealed that these
words fell into two major categories: words that described moral feelings and words that
described moral actions. Since both feelings and actions are important triggers for
recollection, the decision was made to split the cued recall task into two sections (with 10
cues each). A third category was added to help participants recollect the very best and worst
moral events in their lives. This ‘superlatives’ category contained 6 cues. Four control words
(2 emotions, 2 actions) were added to the sets to use for comparison. Kucera-Francis word
frequencies (Kucera, H., & Francis, W. N., 1967) and the Affective Norms for English
Words (ANEW) (Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J., 1999) were used to select a final set of cue
words that were balanced by emotional valence and frequent in common English. (Table 2
shows the final cue words.) The final set of cue words was also checked for outliers in word
length (mean = 7.95 ± 2.37, range = 4–13 letters) and written frequency (mean = 21.35 ±
23.14, range = 1 –71).
Data Transcription
The memories were manually transcribed from the original recordings by research assistants
who were blind to the identity of the participants. They were made anonymous by replacing
names and other information in the narrative that could serve to identify individuals. Care
was taken when replacing identifying data (names, locations) to retain the character of the
identifier (e.g. age and gender associated with the name). The transcribed memories were
edited for grammar, coherence and readability, but vernacular and agrammatical figures of
speech were maintained as much as possible, to allow the memories to retain the
participant’s style of recounting.
Moral Memory Selection
From a total of 3300 memories produced by the 100 subjects, we identified 758 as
autobiographical moral memories. Our criteria for this selection were that the memories
needed to be: 1. episodic and personal (specific, datable events), 2. moral and 3. involve a
decision or choice (resulting in an intentional action or omission of an action). Events that
were not recounted in the first person were excluded, as were events that were generic or
overly vague. The moral status of the memory required agreement by two independent raters
on at least one of two key criteria: (1) objective harm or prevention of harm, or (2) feelings
of right or wrong associated with the event described by the memory. In subsequent
discussions with a number of psychologists and philosophers involving several examples of
the moral memories collected, there was no disagreement on the criteria used. Our intent
was to select as broad a class of moral events, by any definition, as possible.
Memory Ratings
For the second visit, participants were given transcripts of the moral memories they had
narrated on the first visit and were asked to date them and rate them on multiple dimensions.
Participants were still blind to the ‘moral’ testing parameter although it usually became clear
during this testing session. A 52 item, computer-administered questionnaire was used to
elicit information about several factors: general background information about the action in
the memory, the emotions the participant felt about their behavior in the memory, and moral
judgments about their behavior in the memory. The moral judgments were subdivided; we
asked participants to rate and explain their behavior at the time the memory occurred, their
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perceptions of their actions now as they look back on the memory, their beliefs about how
others would view their actions, and general questions about how ethical they believed
themselves to be. These questions were repeated for each moral memory that the participant
had generated. (See Supplementary Materials for the full questionnaire).
Memory transcripts were also rated by an independent group of 55 adult raters, none of
whom had participated in the main experiment. Raters judged the actions in the narrative (26
attributes), the narrator’s reasons for the actions (18 attributes), and the narrator’s feelings
about the actions (12 attributes; see Supplementary Materials for the full list; the ones we
analyzed here are denoted by asterisks). Here we analyze ratings of six of these questions:
whether each memory involved helping/hurting someone, doing the right/wrong thing,
feelings of personal moral strength/weakness. These six features were selected for analysis
because they establish strong valence dichotomies in each pair.
RESULTS
As Table 1 bears out, all our participants were healthy and representative adults. Participants
all treated the experiment quite seriously; several were in tears after recounting their
memories and generally endorsed ratings on the exit questionnaire that indicated a high level
of emotional involvement (on a 1–10 rating for the question, “How emotional did you feel
during this study?”; mean = 7.16±1.89). Our follow-up phone study assured us that there
was little or no confabulation, since all of the 44 subjects we contacted strongly indicated
they had provided honest accounts and since the 11 subjects whose memories we probed for
reliability all produced narratives that matched their original memories.
Memory Remoteness influences Valence of Cue Words
Simply rank-ordering cue words according to the mean age of the memories they had
produced (Figure 1A) suggested a pattern whereby more remote memories were associated
with more negative cue words. As a further initial exploration, we examined memories
elicited by the cue ‘memorable’, by grouping them into those rated positive versus those
rated negative, using ratings from three independent raters. The mean age of the positive
memorable events fell nearly 8 years earlier than that of the negative memorable events
(Figure 1A). However, given the small number of items in each group (n = 8), this
difference did not achieve statistical significance (t[14] = 1.16, p = 0.26).
We next plotted memory remoteness against the rated valence of the cue word (Figure 1B).
Here we found a significant relationship: the mean age of memories produced by cues with a
positive valence was less than that of memories produced by cues with a negative valence
(t[25] = 3.95, p<0.001). Similarly, there was a significant positive regression of cue-word
valence on age of memory (R(26) = 0.74, p = 0.004). Given our relatively narrow age range
(40–60), we thought it likely that this effect would also be obtained if absolute chronological
age at the time of the memory event were used, rather than remoteness. Indeed, we found
that there was little difference in the distributions between absolute age of the subject at the
time of the memory and the age of memory, and the above association with cue-word
valence held. The association also held when we split participants into the youngest and
oldest fifty, demonstrating that the participant’s age at the time of the memory, and/or
memory remoteness were driving the effect.
Memory remoteness influences valence of the memory
We next examined the recollected narratives themselves. We began with an automated text
analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count database (Pennebaker, Chung,
Ireland, Gonzales, & Booth, 2007), which counts the number of words in a sequence of text
Escobedo and Adolphs Page 5
Emotion. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2011 August 1.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
in terms of their frequency in various categories. We examined positive and negative
emotion categories. While there was a small effect of the word count of emotionally
valenced words as a function of memory remoteness (R(498) = 0.26, p = 0.14), this was not
anywhere near statistically significant, a null finding that is perhaps not surprising given that
the emotional semantic content of the narrative is likely only weakly related to mere
frequencies of emotion words within it.
We found a clearer effect when the memories were categorized by the 55 independent raters;
here we focused on three pairs of categories that had clear opposites: moral weakness versus
strength, doing the right thing versus the wrong thing, and hurting someone versus helping
someone (Figure 2). Each of these pairs showed a significant difference with respect to the
mean age of the memories (t[972] = 5.44, p < 0.001; t[1192] = 8.68, p < 0.001; and t[958] =
7.95, p < 0.001, respectively). When the means of the three negative categories were
contrasted with the means of the three positive categories, a significant difference was also
found (t[4] = 9.21, p < 0.001).
Possible covariates
To probe for possible factors that could influence the above effects, we examined a large
number of possible covariates, including age, gender, IQ, mood, ethnicity, religion, political
affiliation, and personality (Table 1). None of these effects had a significant effect on the
pattern of findings, arguing that the above results hold across a wide range of individuals.
Passive forgetting versus active repression
One could hypothesize a number of effects driving the above findings. Perhaps negatively
valenced moral memories were more emotionally arousing, and hence less susceptible to
forgetting over time, accounting for their disproportionate representation in remote epochs.
A different possibility might be that subjects actively reconstructed their autobiography so
as to render their most recent acts in the most favorable light and relegate bad deeds to the
distant past. As an initial exploration of these possibilities, we further examined the ratings
collected from the participants during their second testing session. We used ratings of
intensity and emotionality as measures of the arousal of each narrative and ratings of
reflection upon self as measures of impact on self-image 1. Linear regression of each of
these variables showed no significant effect of arousal on the remoteness of the narrative
(Intensity R(733) = 0.065, p = 0.91; Emotionality R(733) = 0.07, p = 0.89), but a significant
effect of self-image on remoteness (Reflection on Self R(733) = 0.30, p = 0.016; General
Reflection R(733) = 0.30, p = 0.015).
DISCUSSION
We collected and analyzed a large and rich set of data to investigate the temporal
distribution of moral autobiographical memories. We found that memories of more positive
moral events, on average, corresponded to more recent events than did memories of more
negative moral events. While the effect also held for chronological age of the memory as
such, this may be simply a result of our compressed age range of participants rather than an
alternative explanation; the fact that the effect held for people in their forties as well as for
people in their fifties argues that remoteness of the memory as such may be most
responsible. The effect was not modulated by gender, IQ, mood, ethnicity, or personality.
1Participants answered the following questions: "How intense was this experience?" (1 = not intense at all, 10 = extremely intense);
"How emotional was this experience for you?" (1 = not emotional at all, 10 = extremely emotional); "How well does this story reflect
your general behavior?" (1 = I never act like this, 10 = I always act like this); "How well does this story reflect on you?" (1 = It
reflects very badly on me, 10 = It reflects very well on me).
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The findings suggest that there is a general bias in how we construct our autobiographical
past, with a tendency to remember the most recent events as those that are also the most
morally positive.
It is surprising that there were no effects due to gender, personality, or any of the other
factors we examined, since one might have expected there to be such a relationship. In
particular, we had expected associations between personality traits and the magnitude of our
memory bias and also gender effects. However, these may be evident in more detailed
analyses of the style and material recalled, such as distinctions between gist and detail that
have been reported for gender effects (Cahill, 2005), a topic for future analyses. Working
against obtaining such a finding in the present study was the comprehensive assessment of
subjects and exclusion of any with a history of psychiatric illness, including mood or
personality disorders.
One initial reaction to our findings might be to focus on the age of the participants rather
than the age of the memories, and to situate the results in light of socioemotional selectivity
theory (Carstensen, 1995). This framework is supported by a large literature showing that
older people focus more on maintaining positive emotions than do younger people, an effect
that appears to be parametric across the lifespan (Charles et al., 2001) and that influences
many aspects of cognition including memory (Kennedy et al., 2004). While the restricted
age range of our sample (40–60 years) would not be expected to result in a large positivity
effect due to aging, we checked whether the effect we reported held regardless of the age of
our participants. We found that it did; the results look the same whether from people in their
40s or their 50s. It is also interesting to consider a recent study (Fernandez et al., 2008) that
suggests at least one contribution to the positivity effect on memory in older people may
result specifically from an increase in positively-valenced confabulations, rather than in
differential recall of veridical memories alone. Relatedly, older people may experience a
stronger feeling of familiarity for positively-valenced material in recognition memory tasks
(Spaniol et al., 2008). While we have neither a young comparison group in our study nor a
definitive measure of memory accuracy, the middle-age range and lack of any evident effect
of age in our sample, together with the ability of participants reliably to re-tell their
previously produced memories, leads to us to suspect that our findings result from a real
effect of the remoteness of the memory per se.
However, there is another explanation important to consider: the age of the participants not
at the time of testing, but at the time that the memory occurred. As we reported here, our
data are compatible also with an effect of the age of a person at the time of the memory
event, as well as with remoteness (since the two are highly correlated in our sample). It is
therefore a distinct possibility that a large class of morally negative events are
overrepresented in younger people -- perhaps because of their circumstances and lifestyle,
and/or the way that they experience events. Young people’s moral actions may not need to
be intrinsically more negatively valenced than those of older people, but their experience of
them could be. Future work will be required to disentangle this possibility from the one we
favor, a genuine memory bias, explanation of which we turn to next.
Our findings can be generally related to several theories in social psychology that aim to
account for how we access, use, and possibly distort information about ourselves in the
service of creating a positive and resilient self-image. Perhaps most salient here is temporal
self-appraisal theory (Wilson & Ross, 2001). This line of work begins with the observation
that we not only compare ourselves to others around us, but we also compare ourselves to
how we were in the past or might be in the future-- indeed, we might engage in such cross-
temporal self comparisons more often than we make comparisons with other people (Wilson
& Ross, 2000). One effect found in this line of research is that people tend to ignore,
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discount or otherwise distance themselves from past failures with the result of enhancing a
sense of self-improvement over time (Ross & Wilson, 2002). These findings from temporal
self-appraisal theory could also be combined with theories about how we judge similarity or
contrast to our present self-image. For instance, Mussweiler’s (2003) Selective Accessibility
Model argues that in cases where similarity is primed, assimilation judgments are made,
whereas in cases where dissimilarity is primed, contrast judgments are made. Putting these
threads together would yield the following hypothetical mechanism: when participants are
asked to recollect memories from cue words they feel are not representative of who they are,
they will tend to maximize the temporal distance of the memory in an effort to distance their
current self from the past self. Or conversely, when participants recollect events from their
remote past, they will tend to recollect events that they would judge to be emotionally most
dissimilar from their current self.
This idea could be further tested in a number of ways in future studies. One important
extension would be to characterize in more detail, or experimentally manipulate,
participants’ current mood. We did measure personality as well as mood (cf. Table 1) but
found no interaction with these factors; however, this may well have been because we had a
relatively narrow range on these factors due to our selection criteria, which excluded
individuals with mood or personality disorders that would have produced a psychiatric
diagnosis. Another interesting line of future work could explicitly manipulate participants’
current personality focus at the time of recollection (Hanko, Crusius, & Mussweiler, 2009),
or measure participants’ self-esteem (Mussweiler, Gabriel & Bodenhausen, 2000). A focus
on positive valence or on praiseworthy moral acts, together with low self-esteem of the
participant, might all arguable drive an increase in temporal remoteness for negatively-
valenced memories of moral events like we observed.
Given our focus on moral memories, rather than emotional memory more generally, we also
considered our findings in relation to construal-level theory (Trope and Liberman, 2003),
which would argue that moral events are viewed increasingly in terms of moral principles
(rather than in terms of specific context and circumstance) the more remote they are (Eyal,
Liberman & Trope, 2008). “Remoteness” in construal-level theory is operationalized as
either temporal remoteness or psychological remoteness more generally, and the overall
effect in the cited study (Eyal et al., 2008) was to increase the judged blameworthiness and
praiseworthiness of moral actions with increasing remoteness. Consistent with construal-
level theory, we had found that increasing memory remoteness was associated with
increased judgments that the memory reflected accurately on the kind of person one is-- just
the abstract, principle-driven perspective predicted by construal-level theory. But, in our
study, why would negative moral events be associated with these dimensions, rather than
positive ones? One possibility may well be the highly personal nature of the memories.
Participants in our study were not asked to consider hypothetical events, and the
confidential, anonymous nature of the memories we collected may thus have resulted in a
style of retrieval more akin to a confession than a justification. Returning to the other
theoretical frameworks we noted earlier-- temporal self-appraisal theory and the selective
accessibility model -- would provide mechanisms for the specific valence effect we
observed. We thus favor the interpretation that people honestly view their past in a morally
critical light, but that at the same time they tend to emphasize that they have been
improving: we may sometimes be bad, but are becoming better people with time.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1.
Moral memories elicited by positively valenced cues are more recent. (A) Temporal
distribution of memories as evoked by specific cue words (means). Positive and negative
memories evoked by the itself valence-neutral cue “most memorable” are marked with
arrows. (B) Emotional valence of the cue words is associated with the age of the memories
they evoke (R=0.74; p=0.004). Remoteness of memory is shown with solid square symbols;
valence is plotted without symbols.
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Figure 2.
Memories with positive moral content are more recent. Black bars are negative moral
content; gray bars are positive moral content (means and SEM). Contrasts between each of
the oppositely valenced pairs of categories were significant (p < 0.001, for all three pairs).
The contrast when comparing all three negative categories to all three positive categories
was also significant (p < 0.001).
Escobedo and Adolphs Page 13
Emotion. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2011 August 1.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
Escobedo and Adolphs Page 14
Table 1
Demographic and background information on participants. Means and S.D. are given from the Wechsler
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) (Wechsler, 1999), NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) (Costa &
McCrae, 1992), Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and the
Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ) (Forsyth, 1980).
Age 48.9 ±5.9 years (range: 40–60)
Gender 47 Male/ 53 Female
IQ (WASI) 110.5 ±13.4 (range 77–138)
Ethnicity 50 Caucasian, 11 Black*, 10 Asian, 25 Hispanic, 4 other
Education 1 Elementary School, 9 High School, 41 Some College, 31 Bachelor’s
Degree, 13 Master’s Degree, 5 Graduate Degree
Current Religion° 49 Christian, 3 Jewish, 3 Buddhist, 19 Other, 25 Atheist/Agnostic
Personality
(NEO-FFI)
Neuroticism: 32 ±5; Extraversion: 40±4; Openness: 36±4;
Agreeableness: 37±5; Conscientiousness: 41±3
Mood (PANAS) Positive Affect: 34 ±7; Negative Affect: 14±7
Ethics (EPQ) Idealism: 3.7 ±0.6; Relativism: 3.0±0.7
°
No participants were practicing Hindus or Muslims.
*
Black included participants of African and African-American descent.
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Table 2
Cue words used to elicit moral memories. Three control cues (tired, exercised and funny) are not included in
the table. Means (SD) are shown for valence ratings taken from the Affective Norms of English Words
(ANEW) (Bradley & Lang, 1999), our own independent rating data, and the frequencies of each word in
standard written English using the Kucera-Francis frequencies (Kucera & Francis, 1967). Words were chosen
using the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981) and supplemented with our own.
Cue Number of
Moral
Memories
ANEW Valence
Rating
Independent
Valence Ratings
Kucera- Francis
Word Frequency
Best Thing 4 * 8.80 (0.41) *
Bittersweet 3 5.32 (1.06) 1
Cheated 66 1.23 (0.47) Cheat: 3
Compassionate 42 8.39 (0.78) 2
Doubtful 7 3.07 (0.41) 22
Embarrassed** 1 3.03 (1.85) 1.64 (0.67) 8
Guilty 51 2.63 (1.98) 1.64 (0.67) 29
Happy 7 8.21 (1.82) 8.59 (0.47) 98
Honest 45 7.70 (1.43) 8.18 (0.67) 47
Hurtful to Someone 34 Hurt: 1.90 (1.26) 0.82 (0) Hurt: 37
Lied 56 Lie: 2.79 (1.92) 1.64 (0.67) Lie: 59
Memorable° 18 ---- ---- ----
Most Afraid Others Will Find
Out
20 *
Afraid: 2.00 (1.28)
1.23 (0.47) *
Afraid: 57
Most Like Others to Know 5 * 7.77 (0.47) *
Most Like to Change 7 * 1.43 (0.78) *
Most Proud 5 * 8.59 (0.47) *
Proud 5 8.03 (1.56) 8.80 (0.41) 50
Qualms 18 2.66 (1.23) --
Reckless 10 2.25 (1.93) 9
Regretful 36 2.28 (1.42) 1.64 (0.67) 1
Relieved 9 7.57 (0.78) Relieve: 13
Responsible 13 7.77 (1.42) 71
Sneaky 56 2.25 (0.78) 2
Tempted 39 3.68 (1.06) Tempt: 2
Took Something 78 1.43 (0.78) ¥
Unfaithful 41 2.05 (1.55) 0.82 (0) 1
Virtuous 29 Virtue: 6.22 (2.06) 7.98 (0.41) Virtuous: 6
Virtue: 30
Worst Thing 29 * 0.82 (0) *
*
Superlative cues were phrases and therefore do not have an ANEW rating.
**
Embarrassed was excluded from the analyses because it was an outlier.
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°
The word “memory” does have an ANEW (6.62 (1.50)) and K-F rating (76) but the testing cue ‘memorable’ was somewhat different from the
other cues and not intended to evoke recollections based on the cue itself.
¥
Kucera-Francis Frequency for steal: 5.
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